NAWAAZ KHALFAN

Web: www.nawaazkhalfan.com

Email: khalfan@sas.upenn.edu

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

Placement Director: Iourii Manovskii	MANOVSKI@ECON.UPENN.EDU	215-898-6880
Placement Director: Holger Sieg	HOLGERS@ECON.UPENN.EDU	215-898-7194
Graduate Student Coordinator: Gina Conway	GNC@SAS.UPENN.EDU	215-898-5691

Office Contact Information:

133 South 36th Street

Philadelphia, PA 19104

267-206-0486

Personal Information: *DOB*: 09/22/1992, *Citizenship*: Australian, *Language(s)*: English

Undergraduate:

The Australian National University, 2011 to 2014

Bachelor of Economics with first class honours and a minor in Econometrics

Thesis: "Comparing Patent Regimes: An Analysis of Sequential Innovation under Incomplete Contracts'"

Supervisor: Rohan Pitchford

Masters:

University of Pennsylvania, 2016 to 2019

Master of Arts in Economics

Thesis: "Search with Evolving Outside Options"

Readers: Rakesh Vohra, Andrew Postlewaite

Graduate Studies:

University of Pennsylvania, 2019 to present

Doctor of Philosophy in Economics (expected completion: May 2023)

Thesis: "Strategic Search and Exploration"

Thesis Committee and References:

Rakesh Vohra (co-advisor), Professor of Economics, George A. Weiss and Lydia Bravo Weiss University Professor, rvohra@seas.upenn.edu, 215-898-6777

George Mailath (co-advisor), Professor of Economics, Walter H. Annenberg Professor in the Social Sciences, gmailath@econ.upenn.edu, 215-898-7908

Aislinn Bohren, Associate Professor of Economics, abohren@sas.upenn.edu, 215-898-7908

Teaching and Research Fields:

Primary fields: Microeconomic Theory, Information Economics, Mechanism Design, Game Theory

Secondary fields: Search and Exploration, Market Design, Industrial Organization

Teaching Experience:

The University of Pennsylvania

As instructor:

    BDS 509: Applied Game Theory - 2022 Summer

    ECON 1/LPS 601: Introductory Microeconomics - 2019 Spring, 2020 Fall, 2020 Summer

As teaching assistant:

    PPE 3001: Strategic Reasoning - 2022 Fall

    ECON 262: Market Design - 2021 Spring

    ECON 235: Industrial Organization - 2020 Fall

    ECON 1: Introductory Microeconomics - 2018 Spring, 2018 Fall

    ECON 10: Introductory Business Economics - 2017 Fall, 2021 Fall

The Australian National University

As tutor and teaching assistant:

    ECON 8021: Topics in Microeconomic Theory (graduate) - 2015 S2

    ECON 3101: Microeconomics III – 2016 S1

    ECON 3100: Economics IV Honours – 2015 S2

    ECON 2141: Strategic Thinking – 2015 S2, 2016 S1

    ECON 2101: Microeconomics II – 2015 S1

    ECON 1101: Microeconomics I – 2014 S2, 2015 S1

    ECHI 1006: The Australian Economy – 2013 S2, 2014 S1

Research Experience:

    Research and teaching assistant for Professor Rohan Pitchford at the ANU Research School of Economics, 2015-2016

    Research assistant for Professor Peter Drysdale and Dr. Shiro Armstrong at the East Asia Bureau of Economic Research at the ANU Crawford School of Public Policy, 2015-2016

    Research assistant for Dr. Paul Chen and Dr. Martin Richardson at the ANU Research School of Economics conducting behavioral experiments, 2016

    Research and teaching assistant for Dr. Juergen Meinecke at the ANU Research School of Economics in lectures in econometrics, 2015

    Economic Analyst at the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) in the Weighted Average Cost of Capital team at the Australian Energy Regulator (AER), 2014

Scholarships and Awards:

College of Business and Economics Teaching Award for Excellence in Tutoring, 2015

Economic Society Prize for Economics III, 2014

Commercial Representatives' and Agents' Association of Australia Limited Prize, 2013

Economic Society Prize for Economics II (Honours), 2012

Gold and Silver Duke of Edinburgh Award, 2009 and 2010

Canberra Grammar School Medal for Outstanding Contribution, 2010

Bill De Salis Scholarship, 2009 and 2010

Warren-Williams Award, 2009

Research Papers:

1. "Optimal Allocation with Noisy Inspection" [Job Market Paper]

A principal receives an unknown reward from allocating to an agent who has private information about the reward. Prior to allocating, the principal may elicit a report from the agent and inspect them at a cost but must do so without transfers. When the private information is noisy, the unique separating mechanism that maximizes the principal's expected return segments signals into two groups, inspects the high types, allocating to them only if the inspected return is sufficiently positive, and doesn't inspect low types, compensating them with a small probability of allocation. This relates to several applied settings such as employer hiring strategies, public grant mechanisms and portfolio investment rules.

2. "Strategic Private Exploration"

In a strategic exploration game, multiple players determine the order in which they explore unknown options with the objective of maximizing the sum of discovered rewards. Exploration is private in the sense that players cannot condition the order in which they explore on their competitor's decisions. Equilibrium exploration procedures are determined, and losses characterized as a function of how the rewards are split when simultaneously explored. This informs us about many areas of policy design including patent and copyright regimes, R&D tournaments, and competition regulation.

3. "Pandora's Linear Program" with Rakesh Vohra

In this article, we map Weitzman's canonical search problem into a linear program that allows us to re-derive existing results and extend the setup to problems pertaining to strategic search, information acquisition, index manipulation and robust search.

Research Projects:

A. "Optimal Allocation with Noisy Search and Sequential Testing"

B. "Manipulation Robust Search Procedures"